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I.
INTRODUCTION
The Mexican State has not managed to reduce the problem of
corruption in the country. After two decades of policies without visible outcomes, Enrique Peña Nieto’s Government prompted the creation of the National Anti-Corruption System (Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, hereinafter SNA). The legal reforms to create this new
system, hailed as the ultimate solution to overcome the problem, began in 2015. Three years later, close to the ending of Peña Nieto’s
period, the system has not been put into full operation. This omission is due to the lack of consensus among the government, the legislature, and civil society.
The creation of an anti-corruption agency, such as the SNA, responded to international organizations’ recommendations. Also,
Mexican civil society groups gave significant support to the proposal. For these reasons, the incoming government should consider
the convenience of giving continuity to this agency. Andrés Manuel
López Obrador comes to Presidency with considerable political support, which will let him achieve the political consensus required to
complete the SNA’s implementation. The next government’s grand
challenge will be to overcome the previous Mexican reformers’
fault, which has been to assume that the creation of institutions is
the only goal, without worrying about providing the necessary resources to get results.
In this transition context, this article reviews the Mexican SNA’s
principal characteristics and discusses its foreseeable future. Section
II briefly describes the serious panorama of corruption that led to the
creation of the SNA. This article refers to examples of the types of
corruption that have been identified in recent times in the country,
among others: great political corruption; small bureaucratic corruption; and corruption in both the criminal justice system and in the
police force, which in some cases has been captured by the organized crime.
The following section reviews the SNA’s creation process. The
agency’s legal framework consists of seven laws enacted in 2016
that develops the constitutional reforms promulgated in 2014 and
2015. The main objective of this legal and institutional framework
is to bring together anti-corruption related institutions in a central
coordination committee. Four anti-corruption institutions run the
main branches of the SNA: internal control of the administration;
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auditing process; investigation; prosecution; and sanction of administrative responsibilities as well as criminal.
Section IV discusses the SNA’s immediate future with the incoming government on the horizon. Some of the reforms that may
be promoted by López Obrador’s administration, according to the
public agenda of its party, the National Regeneration Movement
(Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, hereinafter MORENA), are
mentioned. This paper also highlights some legislative measures
that the next government should carry out to fulfill the implementation of international conventions against corruption, which Mexico
signed.
The article argues the SNA should not be considered the ultimate
solution to Mexico’s corruption problem. Most likely, the agency
will not give results if its job is unaccompanied by policies promoting a cultural shift in the country. The current organizational culture,
which allows corruption practices both in public and private fields,
should be replaced by a culture based on integrity and values. Also,
a culture of denouncement and punishment of corrupt practices
should replace the customary impunity.
II.
CORRUPTION’S PICTURE IN RECENT MEXICO
Corruption has been a hot topic in Mexico’s recent history with
great media coverage.1 The beginning of the 21st century was markedly bad for Mexican society in this matter because the hopes of
change generated by the rotation of political power never materialized. In 2000, society believed that the defeat of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, hereinafter PRI) and the National Action Party’s (Partido Acción
Nacional, hereinafter PAN) arrival to power would transform the
conditions that allowed corruption and impunity. Before long, the
new administration disappointed society because the expected institutional transformation never happened.2
1

See Ernesto Garzón Valdés, Acerca de la calificación moral de la corrupción: Tan solo una propuesta, 21 ISONOMÍA 9, 16 (2004) (stating that political
corruption in democratic systems “is in vogue” because the amount of journalistic
writings and TV programs on this issue is immense).
2
See Mathieu Tromme & Miguel Angel Lara Otaola, Enrique Peña Nieto’s
National Anti Corruption Commission and the Challenges of Waging War against

88

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:85

Corruption, instead of decreasing, increased during the last three
presidential periods. Continual “soap-opera-like scandals”3 revealed
“grand corruption”4 cases, one after another. Presidents themselves
were involved in accusations of corruption related to the granting of
multimillionaire public contracts, such as the Fox issue and Oceanografía,5 Calderón and the Odebrecht case,6 and Peña Nieto’s white
house.7 The situation was similar on the local government level. In
recent years, at least 42 former governors were mentioned by the
press as suspects of acts of corruption.8 Only 17 were officially investigated.9

Corruption in Mexico, 30 MEXICAN STUDIES/ESTUDIOS MEXICANOS 557, 561
(2014) (“[T]he transition from PRI to PAN in many ways has continued the status
quo. Instead of taking the opportunity to truly change the democratic foundations
and to eradicate opportunities for clientelism, politics remains highly personalized.”).
3
Stephen D. Morris, Corruption and Mexican Political Culture, 45
JOURNAL OF THE SOUTHWEST 671, 671 (2003).
4
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 444, 2012) (stating that the “grand
corruption” involves “high-level officials” involved on the granting of large public contracts); see also CASAR, MÉXICO: ANATOMÍA DE LA CORRUPCIÓN 32 (2015)
(stating that grand corruption occurs in the higher political stairs).
5
See J. Jesús Esquivel, El enriquecimiento de Oceanografía (y de los hermanos Bribiesca), bajo investigación, PROCESO (Nov. 23, 2013), formato HTML,
https://www.proceso.com.mx/358940/el-enriquecimiento-de-oceanografia-y-delos-hermanos-bribiesca-bajo-investigacion-2.
6
See Jesusa Cervantes, Caso Odebrecht: Los escandalosos silencios de Felipe Calderón, PROCESO (Nov. 4, 2017), formato HTML, https://www.proceso.com.mx/509851/caso-odebrecht-los-escandalosos-silencios-felipe-calderon.
7
In 2014, a journalistic investigation revealed that President Peña Nieto has
a 7-million-dollar residence in Mexico City. This mansion was built to President’s
wife liking by Grupo Higa, a construction company that earned millions in the
State of Mexico when Peña Nieto was governor. See La casa blanca de Enrique
Peña Nieto (investigación especial), ARISTEGUI NOTICIAS (Nov. 9, 2014),
https://aristeguinoticias.com/0911/mexico/la-casa-blanca-de-enrique-penanieto/.
8
Elisabeth Malkin, En México se acumulan los gobernadores corruptos, e
impunes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/04/19/mexico-gobernadores-corrupcion-impunidad-duarte/.
9
Id.
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Since 2000, documented cases of political corruption have included bribes and kickback payments from both national and foreign10 companies to medium-high level public officials for the
awarding of public contracts.11 This generalized practice has become one of the “vices”12 in the procurement and bidding for public
works. Another usual form of corruption has been embezzlement,
which occurs through diversion of public funds to ghost companies’
networks. The recently discovered “master scam”13 is an example of
this large-scale treasury diversion.
The request of unlawful payments in exchange for granting of
permits and administrative licenses has been an ordinary “petty corruption” practice.14 Bribery has turned into a “standardized” activity
for many companies that have included it within their daily operation processes.15 For professionals who negotiate legal matters with
the administration,16 corruption has been inevitable too. The same is
10

Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2 (referring that some U.S. companies
as Lindsey Manufacturing Co., Wal-Mart and Orthofix International were involved in corruption practices in Mexico).
11
See Alejandro Faya Rodríguez, La triste realidad en las contrataciones
públicas,
NEXOS
(Dec.
1,
2016),
formato
HTML,
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=30458.
12
Jorge Fernández Ruiz, Los vicios de la contratación pública en México, 66
DERECHO PUCP. REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO 469 (2011) (noting that
public sector contracts award is carried out without rectitude because the vices are
incubated in the legal regulation itself, which allows corruption).
13
See La Estafa maestra. Graduados en desaparecer dinero público,
ANIMAL POLÍTICO (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.animalpolitico.com/estafa-maestra/ (discussing that during Peña Nieto’s administration, several Federal government’s agencies diverted 7 billion pesos (USD 45 million), giving them to 128
ghost companies through illegal contracts).
14
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION AT THE SECTOR LEVEL AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 86 (2015) (stating that “petty corruption
refers to minor payments for services that should have been offered free of charge
or extra payments for services formally offered at a set price”).
15
David Arellano Gault, Corrupción ¿calle de una sola vía? La internalización del soborno en empresas en México, 84 IZTAPALAPA. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS
SOCIALES Y HUMANIDADES 163, 163 (2018) (stating that “companies build routines and internal solutions that allow them to meet the demand of bribery from
public officials [ . . . ] companies create stable and organized internal processes to
pay bribes as a normalized act”).
16
José C. García González et al., Public Sector Corruption in Mexico: Social
Representations Among the Legal Community of the Federal District, 37 U.
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true for counselors that litigate before judicial bodies.17 Day after
day, citizens have participated in acts of corruption18 either voluntarily to obtain undue benefits19 and avoid sanctions or compulsorily, when illegal exactions are required in exchange for the provision of public services.20
The most serious corruption has occurred inside security and law
enforcement institutions. Citizens have seen police as a corrupt institution that, instead of acting against crime, has allowed crime to
increase.21 Participation of policemen in crimes like extortion22 and
kidnapping23 has shown the closeness between police forces and

MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 231, 258 (2006) (stating that corruption practices are
habitual in Mexico’s public administration, so “involvement in situations requiring bribery has become unavoidable for the lawyers who want to successfully
negotiate government matters”).
17
See Alberto M. Binder, Corrupción y sistemas judiciales, 10 REFORMA
JUDICIAL. REVISTA MEXICANA DE JUSTICIA 135, 138 (2007) (referring to the types
of corruption inside judicial organizations and the participation of lawyers in acts
of corruption).
18
See CASAR, supra note 4, at 33 (citing polls that report the commission of
more than 4 million annual acts of petty corruption in the contact of citizens with
the authorities).
19
See Bernardo Jiménez & María García, Corrupción y caos urbano en Guadalajara, Jalisco México, in COMO DISMINUIR LA CORRUPCIÓN Y MEJORAR LA
GOBERNABILIDAD EN PAÍSES DE DESARROLLO 69 (María Ramos et al. eds., 2014)
(citing evidence of acts of corruption related to the granting of licenses and permits in Guadalajara, which has caused urban chaos in that city).
20
See Jassel Córdova Guzmán & Aldo F. Ponce, Los tipos de corrupción y
la satisfacción con los servicios públicos. Evidencia del caso mexicano, 70
REGIÓN Y SOCIEDAD 231 (2017) (noting that corruption related to public services
has a negative impact in the citizens’ satisfaction level with the provision of those
services).
21
See Daniel M. Sabet, Corruption or Insecurity? Understanding Dissatisfaction with Mexico’s Police, 55 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 22, 24–
7 (2013) (referring to evidence on corrupt police and stating that corruption is seen
as a “normality in relations between police and citizens”).
22
See Alberto Díaz-Cayeros et al., Caught in the Crossfire: The Geography
of Extortion and Police Corruption in Mexico (Stanford Center for International
Development Working Paper No. 545, Feb. 2015), https://globalpoverty.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/545wp_0.pdf.
23
See Miquel À. Ruiz Torres y Elena Azaola Garrido, Cuadrar el delito. Corrupción institucional y participación de policías en el secuestro en México, 44
PERFILES LATINOAMERICANOS 91 (2014).
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criminal groups and institutional reproduction of corruption inside
police bodies.24
Acts of corruption by the public prosecutor agents have included
the request of “gifts” to negotiate the liberation of arrested delinquents25 and illicit grabbing of narcotics and other confiscated objects related to crimes.26 Filling up the picture, the administration of
justice has not been exempted from the commission of acts of corruption.27
The ceaseless rise of organized crime has worsened the consequences of the close relationship between corruption, delinquency,
and impunity, which was a legacy of 20th century PRI’s regime28
that following governments could not eliminate. For decades, drug
cartels have corrupted policemen and politicians29 by “using plata o
plomo (bribe or bullet) techniques.”30 Facing cartels’ power, officers
have had two options: to be corrupted or to be killed.31
Previous governments have failed to cope with the double trouble of corruption and criminality. In a vicious circle, criminal organ-

24

Id.
See Sánchez, Pablo Guerrero & Álvarez, Luis Pérez, ”México, corrupción
organizacional institucionalizada: un estudio de caso,” Revista Iberoamericana de
las Ciencias Sociales y Humanísticas [RICSH], vol. 5, núm. 9, June 2016.
26
Id.
27
See Binder, supra note 17.
28
See Louise Shelley, Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the
Post-PRI Transition, 17 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 213,
213-14 (2001) (stating that in 2000 President Fox faced the legacy of PRI that
includes “institutionalized grand corruption and the political-criminal nexus of the
drug traffickers with the state apparatus”).
29
See id.; see also Imtiaz Hussain, Mexico at bay? Corrupt crossroads, COMO DISMINUIR LA CORRUPCIÓN Y MEJORAR LA GOBERNABILIDAD EN
PAÍSES DE DESARROLLO 41, 50 (María Ramos et al. eds., 2014) (stating that by the
1990s the cartels “penetrated every segment of public life at all levels of policymaking”).
30
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption, Organized Crime, and Money Laundering, World Bank Roundtable on Institutions, Governance and Corruption,
Montevideo, (2016).
31
See Justin B. Shapiro, What Are They Smoking?! Mexico’s Decriminalization of Small-Scale Drug Possession in the Wake of a Law Enforcement Failure,
42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 115, 121 (2010) (stating that “those honorable
officers who wish to maintain order and integrity will almost certainly be murdered by traffickers”).
25
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izations have generated more corruption which, in turn, has promoted the proliferation of criminality and an increase in violence.32
The firm hand strategy, which has been tackling delinquency since
2000, has produced paradoxical results.33 The greater public force
deployed by the State has produced more corruption and criminal
violence,34 rather than neutralize delinquency.
Scandals of corruption that involve high-level politicians, daily
citizens’ experience with bureaucratic corruption, and capture of police by organized crime have progressively darkened Mexico’s corruption picture. In addition, mass media has spread the idea that corruption is an uncontrollable “cancer” endangering the nation.35 Society’s bad perception about the topic reflects this darkened picture.
Nowadays, corruption is one of the main concerns for Mexicans.36
It is recognized as a serious and frequent problem, which virtually
occurs in almost all institutions.37 In parallel, Mexico’s evaluation

32

See Stephen D. Morris, Corruption, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in
Mexico, 18 THE BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 29 (2012) (stating that corruption facilitates the organized crime and at the same time drug trafficking cannot operate without corruption; also proposing a “paradox”: that corruption once
coexisted and facilitated peaceful operation of drug trafficking, but now coexists
and facilitates a more violent crime).
33
See Edgardo Buscaglia, La Paradoja Mexicana de la Delincuencia Organizada: Policías, violencia y corrupción, REVISTA POLICÍA Y SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA
275, 279 (2012) (noting the “paradox” that occurs when the State assigns more
public force for repression of criminal groups; however, the same criminal groups
generate more violence and corruption because they are always willing to buy
officials).
34
Id.
35
See Fernando Gil Villa, Discursos sobre corrupción en México, 5 REV.
SOCIEDAD & EQUIDAD 259, 261 (2013) (stating that media transmit a “catastrophic message”: corruption is so widespread in the social body and is so lethal
that it threatens democracy and social order).
36
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Resultados de la Encuesta
Nacional de Calidad e Impacto Gubernamental 2017, formato PDF,
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/
boletines/2018/EstSegPub/encig2018_03.pdf (Comunicado de prensa No.
136/18, Mar. 22, 2018) (stating that in 2017 corruption was the second most worrying problem for Mexicans).
37
CASAR, supra note 4, at 19–22 (citing polls that indicate that corruption is
a serious problem for almost 80% of the citizens and is frequent or very frequent
for 88%; also noting that the level of perception of corruption is high practically
in all the analyzed institutions).
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in the main international assessments, such as World Bank’s Governance Indicators38 and Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index,39 has deteriorated in the last two years.
A part of the population has assumed the belief that corruption
is a Mexican cultural problem.40 Scholars have investigated the thesis of the relationship between Mexican culture and corruption,41
even suggesting that corruption is “normal”42 inside Mexican culture.43 Rather than an open approval of corruption, several factors,
among others, that have favored the spread of corruption to systemic
levels44 are presented in Mexican society: great citizen distrust in

38

Mexico’s Percentile Rank in the Control of Corruption Indicator has gone
down to 23.0769 in 2016, the lowest number since 2000. See Worldwide Governance Indicators, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (last visited Aug. 1, 2018),
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#reports.
39
Mexico’s score fell to 29 points in 2017, ranking in 135th place out of 180
countries. It is the lowest score since 2000. Mexico’s score had remained stable
during previous years: 3.3 in 2000, at the beginning of Vicente Fox’s term; 3.3 in
2006, at the beginning of Calderón’s term; and 34 in 2012, at the beginning of
Peña Nieto’s term. See Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL (last visited Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi.
40
See Arturo Rodríguez García, “Me sostengo” en lo dicho, “la corrupción
es cultural”: Peña Nieto, PROCESO (Sept. 8, 2014), formato HTML,
https://www.proceso.com.mx/381646/me-sostengo-en-lo-dicho-la-corrupciones-cultural-pena (explaining that President Peña Nieto himself pointed out that
corruption is a “cultural issue” in Mexico).
41
See Morris, supra note 3, at 676 (stating that “[c]orruption, in many ways,
is deeply ingrained in the Mexican culture”).
42
Hussain, supra note 29, at 44 (stating that “Mexican corruption extends far
beyond institutional settings into cultural confines, and routine daily activities that
perpetrators take to be normal when, in fact, they remain part and parcel of what
constitutes corruption”).
43
Contra Issa Luna Pla, La corrupción no es un problema cultural, HECHOS
Y DERECHOS (Jan. 18, 2018) (stating that corruption is not a cultural problem but
an educative and judicial problem).
44
CASAR, supra note 4, at 22; see also Arellano Gault, supra note 15.
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the government,45 weak culture of legality,46 institutional deficiencies that hinder prosecution and punishment, and wrong organizational behavior that induces corrupt practices.47 Because of this
combination of factors,48 corruption in Mexico is not only a matter
of individuals but a “dense social phenomenon.”49
III.

NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM’S ORIGIN AND
STRUCTURE

A.

Constitutional and Legal Reform Process
The fight against corruption has been a hot issue in the Mexican
governments agenda for several decades.50 Since the 1980s, each
administration has pushed a big solution for the big problem in a
succession of “almost-ritualistic anti-corruption campaigns”51 that
have predominantly been useless.52 Institutional actions have not
45

See Stephen D. Morris, Mexico’s Political Culture: the Unrule of Law and
Corruption as a Form of Resistance, 3 MEXICAN LAW REVIEW 327 (2011) (stating
that Mexicans neither trust the law nor its rulers and consider that sometimes
breaking the law is legitimate).
46
CASAR, supra note 4, at 34 (stating that Mexican citizens do not know the
laws but thinks that disobeying unfair or unfavorable laws is valid); see also Cecilia Güemes, La corrupción y la (des)confianza como normas sociales; Cambio
de enfoque, nuevas perspectivas, REVISTA INTERNACIONAL TRANSPARENCIA E
INTEGRIDAD (Jan./Apr. 2018) (noting that people who fall into corruption think
that others in the same situation would do the same).
47
See David Arellano Gault, Corrupción como proceso organizacional:
comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción, 62
CONTADURÍA Y ADMINISTRACIÓN 810, 813–14 (2017) (stating that organizations
normalize practices and behaviors that induce corruption often as an unexpected
or undesired consequence of the action).
48
See Víctor Mauricio Castañeda Rodríguez, Una investigación sobre la corrupción pública y sus determinantes, 227 REVISTA MEXICANA DE CIENCIAS
POLÍTICAS Y SOCIALES 103 (2016) (noting that corruption is the result of a combination of factors).
49
Arellano Gault, supra note 47.
50
See Daniel Márquez, Mexican Administrative Law Against Corruption:
Scope and Future, 8 MEXICAN L. REV. 75, 81–82 (2015); Tromme & Lara Otaola,
supra note 2, at 561–62; CASAR, supra note 4, at 49–50.
51
Morris, supra note 3.
52
See Jaime Talancón Martínez & Sofía Ramírez Aguilar, Sistema Nacional
Anticorrupción: Voluntad política y exigencia ciudadana, NEXOS (Apr. 1, 2017),
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produced results in the prevention and punishment fields. These failures have been associated with the “lack of political will”53 of the
ruling classes, who have avoided confronting the corrupt gangs’
power.54
With that record of failed solutions55 behind him, Enrique Peña
Nieto proposed his own plan against corruption focusing on two
central axes: strengthening access to public information and creating
an independent oversight body named National Anti-Corruption
Commission.56 The transparency and anti-corruption constitutional
reform initiatives were presented to the Senate by the PRI’s parliamentary group in September and November 2012, even before Peña
Nieto took office.57
During the following two years, the drafts were discussed in the
legislature along with seven other initiatives presented by opposition
parties. Also, congressmen heard civil society groups.58 The constitutional reform on transparency was approved and published in
2014, followed by the constitutional reform on corruption in 2015.59
formato HTML, https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=31917 (stating that anti-corruption institutions of the last decades have been very expensive for the taxpayers
and have offered very few results in very long terms).
53
Id.
54
See Márquez, supra note 50, at 75 (stating that Mexican anticorruption
model “has repeatedly designed administrative rules and structures that are unable
to rise above the political and social spheres”).
55
Id.
56
See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 559 (stating that Peña Nieto
proposed “a) empowering the Federal Institute for the Access to Information and
Data Protection [ . . . ] b) creating an independent body to oversee the purchase of
governmental publicity, as well as c) a National Anti-Corruption Commission”).
57
Presentan en el Senado iniciativa anticorrupción de EPN, ARISTEGUI
NOTICIAS (Nov. 15, 2012), formato HTML, https://aristeguinoticias.com/1511/mexico/presentan-en-el-senado-iniciativa-anticorrupcion-de-epn/.
58
See María Marván Laborde, Siete leyes y un elefante en la sala, HECHOS Y
DERECHOS (July 9, 2016), formato HTML, https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/hechos-y-derechos/article/view/10549/12714; see also CASAR, supra
note 4, at 52.
59
See generally Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia
de transparencia. Proceso legislativo (Feb. 7, 2014), formato PDF http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/docleg/62/215_DOF_07feb14.pdf; see also
Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de
la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de combate
a la corrupción. Proceso legislativo (May 27, 2015), formato PDF,
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These two reforms, which modified around twenty constitutional articles, establish the bases of two coordination agencies: the National
Transparency System (Sistema Nacional de Transparencia, hereinafter SNT) and the SNA.
The SNT began to work in 2015 after the transparency law was
enacted.60 The system integrates an autonomous national body in
charge of policies on transparency, access to information and personal data protection (Instituto Nacional de Transparencia, Acceso
a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales, hereinafter
INAI), and local institutes with reinforced attributes.61 Other institutions such as the Chief Audit Office of the Federation (Auditoría
Superior de la Federación, hereinafter ASF), the General Archive
of the Nation (Archivo General de la Nación), and the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística
y Geografía) are also included.62 The SNT’s objectives are coordinating the elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive public policy on transparency, access to information, data protection,
and strengthening oversight and effective accountability.63
The creation of the SNT reinforces an open government model
in which transparency is a key action in the anti-corruption strategy.64 As is known, open access to public information for the press
and the citizenship contributes to discovering corruption practices

http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/docleg/62/223_DOF_27may15.pdf.
60
See generally Ley General de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información
Pública [LGTAIP], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], May 4, 2015.
61
See Gobierno Federal, Reforma en Materia de Transparencia. Resumen
Ejecutivo (Sept. 9, 2016), formato HTML, https://www.gob.mx/sfp/acciones-yprogramas/reforma-en-materia-de-transparencia-64474.
62
See LGTAIP, supra note 60, art. 30.
63
SISTEMA NACIONAL DE TRANSPARENCIA,
formato
HTML,
http://www.snt.org.mx/ (consultada Sept. 9, 2018).
64
See Martín Cutberto Vera Martínez et al., El modelo de Gobierno Abierto
en América Latina. Paralelismo de las políticas públicas de transparencia y la
corrupción, in 53 ÍCONOS. REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 85 (Pedro Salazar et.
al. cords., 2017) (noting that access to public information is a democratic instrument for combating corruption).
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and produces a deterrent effect.65 In addition, the start-up of the National Transparency Platform (Plataforma Nacional de Transparencia)66 links the transparency policies with the e-government
model.67
The 2015 constitutional reform laid the foundations of the SNA,
whose legal framework was developed by the seven secondary laws
enacted in 2016, four of which were new laws68 and three of which
were amendments to already existing laws.69 The system was created to coordinate efforts of federal and local authorities in charge
of administration control, oversight and auditing, and detection and
sanctioning of acts of corruption. The SNA’s main task will be the
design and putting public policies into practices in these matters.70
Other agents, in addition to the government, pushed for the creation of the SNA. On the one hand, civil society supported the project of an independent anti-corruption agency with citizen members.71 Since Vicente Fox’s term, the involvement of civil society in

65
See Ximena Puente de la Mora, La transparencia y el acceso a la información como herramientas contra la corrupción, CÓMO COMBATIR LA
CORRUPCIÓN, 107 (2017).
66
PLATAFORMA NACIONAL DE TRANSPARENCIA, formato HTML,
https://www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx/ (consultada July 10, 2018).
67
See generally Laura Sour Vargas, Gobierno electrónico y corrupción en
México (2005-2010), 27 REVISTA INNOVAR 123 (2017) (stating that e-government
promotes transparency in relations between public officials and citizens and reduces the chances of committing corruption acts).
68
See generally Ley General del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción
[LGSNA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley General de
Responsabilidades Administrativas [LGRA], Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa [LOTFJA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016; Ley de
Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas de la Federación [LFRCF], Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DOF], July 18, 2016.
69
See Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal [LOAPF], as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], Dec. 29, 1976; Ley Orgánica de
la Procuraduría General de la República [LOPGR], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], May 29, 2009; Código Penal Federal [CPF], Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF], Aug. 14, 1934.
70
See SISTEMA NACIONAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN, formato HTML,
http://sna.org.mx/ (consultada July 10, 2018).
71
See Marván Laborde, supra note 58.
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the fight against corruption commenced to grow.72 This process was
fueled by the idea that civil society is uncontaminated,73 unlike politicians. Therefore, it can achieve better results in government control.74 In recent years, non-governmental organizations and scholars
have asked in public forums about the “citizenisation” (ciudadanización)75 of anti-corruption institutions. Citizen pressure finally led
to the incorporation of the Citizen Participation Committee within
the SNA. This Committee will be a permanent link between the new
agency and civil society.
On the other hand, international actors’ advice was a relevant
factor in the SNA’s origin. To a large extent, the legal reforms and
structural changes to combat corruption complied with global market guidelines76 by the book.77 In the last few decades, world institutions like the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-

72

See Morris, supra note 3, at 678 (noting the unique situation of “growing
involvement and empowering of civil society in the fight” against corruption that
took place at the beginning of the century).
73
See Morris, supra note 45, at 334 (stating that in Mexico there is a “prosociety bias” and a sense that “civil society [is] not contaminated” because citizens are “purer” than politicians).
74
See id.
75
See id.; see also Puente de la Mora, supra note 65, at 113.
76
See Barry Hindess, Introduction: How should we think about corruption?,
CORRUPTION: EXPANDING THE FOCUS 1 (2012) (stating that in the dominant contemporary discussion, “corruption is primarily an economic issue, both in its content [ . . . ] and in its most important eﬀects”). This is an “economistic, marketbased view of corruption” promoted by scholars like Susan Rose-Ackerman, who
associates corruption with “dysfunctional public and private institutions” and suggests as remedy “major institutional reforms of the kind promoted by the ‘good
governance’ programs of the World Bank and other international agencies.” Id.;
see also Barry Hindess, Good Government and Corruption, CORRUPTION AND
ANTI-CORRUPTION 1 (2012) (stating that corruption is “a predominantly economic issue” in “the modern understanding” that can be exemplified by Susan
Rose-Ackerman’s account, whose ideas have been accepted by international financial institutions and many aid agencies).
77
See Rose-Ackerman & Truex, supra note 4 (explaining that Mexico has
adopted many provisions tending to “good governance,” including “improving
top-down monitoring and punishment, fostering transparency and citizen involvement [ . . . ] improving the competitiveness of government asset sales and large
purchases, and privatizing certain government services”).
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Operation and Development (hereinafter OECD) have strongly recommended the creation of Anti-Corruption Agencies.78 In the case
of Mexico, the signing of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (hereinafter IACAC)79 and of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereinafter UNCAC)80 compelled the
Mexican State to “create, maintain and strengthen”81 an “[o]versight
[body for] preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corrupt
acts”82 that shall be granted with “the necessary independence”83
and provided with “[t]he necessary material resources and specialized staff.”84
At first, the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República, hereinafter PGR), with mandate for investigating and prosecuting corruption-related crimes in federal matters, assumed the role of competent Anti-Corruption Authority.85 However,
the PGR, hierarchically dependent upon the president, lacked the
specialization and independence required by international standards.86 Along with the PGR, the Inter-Secretarial Commission for
78

See Luis de Sousa, Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and
Irrelevance, RSCAS 2008/09 European University Institute Working Paper , 1
(2009) (stating that “the Bretton Woods financial institutions, international donor
agencies and nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International”
expected the creation of Anti-Corruption Agencies as a part of a response against
corruption from transition and developing countries). Particularly, “[t]he OECD
was probably a pioneer in suggesting the creation of this type of independent and
specialized units to member states as an integral part of their ‘ethics infrastructures.’” Id.
79
Signed by Mexico on March 29, 1996. Ratified by the Senate of the Republic on October 30, 1996.
80
Signed by Mexico on December 9, 2003. Ratified by the Senate of the Republic on April 29, 2004.
81
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. III, Mar. 29, 1996, 35
I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter IACAC].
82
Id. art. III. at 9.
83
United Nations Convention against Corruption, art. 6.2, 43 I.L.M. 37 [hereinafter UNCAC].
84
Id.; see also id. art 36.
85
ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITIES, formato HTML, https://www.acauthorities.org/country/mx (consultada Sept. 10, 2018).
86
See Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of models,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 1 (2008)
(stating that the criteria for effective specialized anti-corruption bodies required
by the UNCAC includes independence, specialization, adequate training, and resources).
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Transparency and Combat of Corruption in the Public Federal Administration (Comisión Intersecretarial para la Transparencia y el
Combate a la Corrupción en la Administración Pública Federal),
created by Vicente Fox, was the first agency in charge of coordinating anti-corruption efforts across federal government bodies.87
However, this Commission lacked administrative and financial independence too.
The SNA follows the model of a “multi-purpose”88 agency with
faculties of prevention, investigation, repression of corruption, and
policy design and evaluation.89 On paper, Mexico’s SNA has some
similarities with the Hong Kong’s agency,90 which is considered one
of the most successful examples of an anti-corruption institution in
the world.91
B.

Central Committees
Three committees integrate the SNA: the Coordinating Committee, the Citizen Participation Committee, and the Steering Committee of the National Oversight System (Sistema Nacional de Fiscalización, hereinafter SNF). The Executive Secretariat, which is a
technical body, also integrates the SNA jointly with the 32 local
anti-corruption systems that attend through representatives.92
Five Federal institutions converge on the SNA: the ASF, the
Public Function Secretariat of the Federal Executive (Secretaría de
la Función Pública, hereinafter SFP), the Office of the Prosecutor

87
See Acuerdo por el que se crea la Comisión para la Transparencia y el
Combate a la Corrupción en la Administración Pública Federal, como una
comisión intersecretarial de carácter permanente, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF], Dec. 4, 2000, últimas reformas DOF Dec. 19, 2011 (Mex.).
88
Specialized Anti-Corruption Institutions: Review of models, supra note 86,
at 11.
89
Id. (stating that a “multi-purpose” agency is based “on key pillars of repression and prevention of corruption: policy, analysis and technical assistance in
prevention, public outreach and information, monitoring, investigation”).
90
See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 569 (stating that “Mexico’s
Anti-Corruption Commission comes close to the Hong Kong model, in that it
would include investigative, prosecutorial, and awareness-raising powers (El Universal, 2013)”).
91
CASAR, supra note 4, at 47 (stating that the best examples of this model are
the Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s agencies).
92
See LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 7.
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Specialized in Combating Corruption of the PGR (Fiscalía Especializada en Combate a la Corrupción de la PGR, hereinafter
FECC), the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Administrativa, hereinafter TFJA), and the INAI.
These five institutions’ heads, together with a representative of the
Citizen Participation Committee and a representative of the Council
of the Federal Judiciary (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal), shape
the Coordinating Committee.93
The SNA has the mission of “coordinating the fight against corruption among local and federal authorities [as well as] designing
and implementing the anti-corruption policy.”94 The Coordinating
Committee, SNA’s head, is the system’s “fundamental piece”95 that
seeks to overcome defects of previous institutional projects, such as
“fragmentation in policies”96 and “implementation gaps”97 because
of lack of coordination. In addition to its main coordination functions, the Committee has power to issue non-binding public recommendations on the adoption of measures for preventing acts of corruption and improving internal control bodies’ performance.98 It
also has authority to participate in the international cooperation
mechanisms related to conventions.99
The Citizen Participation Committee is composed of five citizens with “probity and prestige,”100 who “have stood out for their
contribution to transparency, accountability or fight against corruption.”101 The Committee’s purpose is to contribute to fulfillment of

93
See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art.
113, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], Feb. 5, 1917, últimas reformas DOF
Feb. 10, 2014 (Mex.).
94
SISTEMA NACIONAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN, supra note 70.
95
Miguel Ángel Gutiérrez Salazar, La Auditoría Superior de la Federación
y la conformación del Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, 37 CUESTIONES
CONSTITUCIONALES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 51, 56
(2017).
96
OECD Integrity Review of Mexico: Taking A Stronger Stance Against Corruption, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 13
(2017).
97
Id.
98
LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 9.IX.
99
See id. art. 9.XVII.
100
Id. art. 16.
101
CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 113.II.
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SNA’s objectives by being a link with social and scholar organizations.102 Among other functions, the Committee can give opinions
on the design of policies,103 propose projects,104 and build a citizen
participation network based on a voluntary registry of civil society
organizations.105 Citizen Committee’s president, as a representative
before the Coordinating Committee, also chairs the SNA.106
The SFP and the ASF, together with the federal states’, audit
bodies and the local secretariats responsible for administrative internal control form the SNF.107 The SNF’s purpose is to establish actions and coordination mechanisms in the matters of internal control,
oversight, and auditing of public funds.108 The two federal agencies’
holders, along with seven rotating members of the local bodies,
shape the SNF’s Steering Committee.109
The SNA’s Executive Secretariat has the nature of a decentralized organism with its own assets and technical and management
autonomy.110 It provides technical support and assistance as well as
the necessary inputs for the functioning of the Coordinating Committee.111 This body will have the fundamental task of warranting
the availability of resources and financial viability of the Committee. The annual Expenditure Budget will allocate the public funds
for this body and for the whole SNA.112
While central committees perform the coordinating and planning desk job, the field job is carried out by the various institutions

102

LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 15.
Id. art. 21.VI.
104
Id. art. 21.VII.
105
Id. art. 21.IX.
106
LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 10.I.
107
Id. art. 37.
108
Id.
109
Id. art. 39.
110
Id. art. 24.
111
LGSNA, supra note 68, art. 25.
112
See id. art. 25.II. (explaining that in 2018, the federal institutions member
of the SNA received jointly Mexican pesos 3,981 million (around USD 205 million)). The 56% went to the ASF. Id. The 4% (almost USD 9 million) went to the
Executive Secretariat and central committees. Id.; see also Presupuesto de
Egresos de la Federación para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2018, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] Nov. 19, 2017 (Mex.).
103
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that converge in the SNA. Each of these bodies performs tasks related to control of public officials, audit of public funds, and determination of responsibilities and punishment of illegal acts.
C.

Internal Control Bodies
The SFP commands the internal control of the administration.
The SFP is a non-autonomous organ, part of the federal centralized
administration, and is dependent on the Executive. Its holder is designated by the president and ratified by the Senate.113 The SFP performs internal control tasks by itself by carrying out the expenditure
inspection and evaluation of administrative management or through
the internal control bodies of each of the federal departments and
agencies, which it coordinates.114 The SFP issues the rules of internal control115 and audit procedures,116 as well as the mechanisms for
the prevention of unlawful acts and the surveillance of public officials.117 Both the SFP and the internal control bodies of the different
agencies oversee the planning and implementation of general mechanisms for the prevention of acts of corruption.118
The SFP also fights corruption through keeping track of public
servants’ declarations of assets and interests.119 It creates and oversees the general policies on public procurement120 and issues the
Code of Ethics and Rules of Integrity for the exercise of public functions.121 Likewise, it has authority for investigating and sanctioning
non-serious administrative misdemeanors.122
D.

Audit Bodies
Oversight tasks are carried out by the SFP in conjunction with
the ASF. The SFP is responsible for auditing and monitoring the

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

See LOAPF, supra note 69, art. 37.
See id. art. 37.I.
See id. art. 37.II.
See id. art. 37.IV.
See id. art. 37.XIX.
See LGRA, supra note 68, art. 15.
See LOAPF, supra note 69, art. 37.XVI.
See id. art. 37.XXI.
See id. art. 37.XXVIII.
See id. art. 37.XVIII.
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expenditure of federal funds from within as part of the federal administration’s internal control bodies functions.123 The ASF performs an external control over all government bodies. Both control
procedures are independent and autonomous.124
Unlike the SFP, the ASF is autonomous. The ASF belongs to the
Chamber of Deputies to the Congress of the Union, but it regulates
as a technical oversight organism125 with management126 and technical127 autonomy. The ASF oversees the State’s treasury use in all
State areas: the three Powers of the Union, the autonomous constitutional bodies, and the state governments and municipalities.128
Likewise, it may audit any individual or private entity that collects,
manages, or expends federal funds.129
The ASF audits the public account after the financial year
ends,130 in accordance with the principle of annuity. However, in
special cases, when well-founded complaints are filed, the ASF may
carry out reviews during the current financial year for the current or
previous annual periods.131 Among the institutions that form the
SNA, the ASF is recognized as the most effective because of its
transparent and objective outcomes in the past.132 In this idea, the
ASF constitutes as the SNA’s “substantive pillar”133 in oversight
matters.
E.

Administrative Responsibilities Subsystem
The SNA’s other central axis is the new public officials’ responsibilities regime. These reforms have strengthened the two areas of
123

See id. art. 37.XXIV.
See LFRCF, supra note 68, art. 6.
125
See id. art. 4.I; see also CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 74.II, 79.
126
Management autonomy refers to the decisions on the internal organization,
structure and functioning, as well as the administration of its human, material and
financial resources. See LFRCF, supra note 68, art. 4.III.
127
Technical autonomy consists in the power to decide on the planning, programming, execution, reporting, and monitoring of the audit process. See id. art.
4.IV.
128
Id. art. 4.XI.
129
Id.
130
Id. art. 6.
131
See id. arts. 59–66; see also CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 79.I.
132
See Gutiérrez Salazar, supra note 95, at 52.
133
Id. at 53.
124
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responsibility for lack of integrity and acts of corruption: administrative and criminal.134
The administrative liability procedure begins when an irregularity that may constitute an administrative misdemeanor is detected
by the control and oversight bodies. An investigation may also begin
when a complaint is filed.135 According to the new rules established
in 2016, administrative misdemeanors are classified into two classes: non-serious and serious. Non-serious infringements consist of
service duty breaches committed by public officials.136 These nonserious infringements are substantiated and if necessary, sanctioned
by the authorities in charge of internal control (the SFP) and external
control (the ASF). Serious misdemeanors are acts of corruption
comparable to criminal offenses (such as bribery, embezzlement,
treasury diversion, information misuse, action under conflict of interest, and trading in influence).137 These serious misdemeanors will
be substantiated and sanctioned by the TFJA, an independent jurisdictional body.138
A big innovation is that the TFJA may also punish private agents
for acts linked to serious administrative misdemeanors. These sanctions will be independent of other types of responsibilities, such as
criminal ones. In addition to economic punishments, disqualification to participate in services or public works hiring may be imposed
as well as compensation for damages.139 The legal entities may also
be sanctioned with an activities suspension or even dissolution. To
do that, the acts related to serious administrative infringements must
be done by individuals acting on behalf of the legal entity and for its

134

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 14, at 96 (stating that the SNA has as one of its objectives: “strengthening enforcement mechanisms for investigating and sanctioning integrity
breaches by public officials and firms under both administrative and criminal jurisdictions”).
135
See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 90–99.
136
See id. art. 49.
137
See id. arts. 51–64.
138
See LOTFJA, supra note 68, arts. 1, 4.
139
See id. art. 20.XI.
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benefit.140 This is a great first step in the fight against corruption in
the private sector.141
As a part of SNA’s reforms, a third section was created within
the TFJA’s Superior Chamber in addition to five Specialized Chambers in the matter of Administrative Responsibilities.142 These bodies will have exclusive competence to resolve and sanction administrative misdemeanors related to corruption. Until September 2018,
because of the lack of political agreements, the appointments of
these magistrates have not been ratified, which means that this
SNA’s branch has not started to work.143
F.

Criminal Responsibilities Subsystem
When the control and oversight bodies in exercise of their faculties identify acts of corruption that may be criminal offenses, they
should submit the corresponding denouncement to the FECC.144 The
FECC is a body with technical and operational autonomy, which is
responsible for investigating the acts that the law considers criminal
offenses of corruption on the federal level. The prosecutor will be
responsible for presenting charges before the judicial authority
where appropriate.145 So, the explicit146 powers (i.e. the fight against
corruption) of this new law enforcement body refer to criminal offenses established in the Tenth Title of the Federal Penal Code.147
140

See id. art. 20.XII.
See Francisco Ibarra Palafox, Corrupción y poderes privados, in CÓMO
COMBATIR LA CORRUPCIÓN 187 (Pedro Salazar et al. coords., 2017).
142
See LOTFJA, supra note 68, arts. 20, 37–39.
143
See Luis Pérez de Acha y Denise Tron Zuccher, ¿Y los magistrados anticorrupción?, EL MUNDO DEL ABOGADO (Aug. 31, 2018), https://elmundodelabogado.com/revista/item/y-los-magistrados-anticorrupcion (referring to the fact that
in April 2017, President Enrique Peña Nieto appointed the 18 anti-corruption
magistrates). According to the law, the appointment had to be ratified by the Senate, which never happened. Id. As a result, in September 2018, the system of administrative responsibilities is not integrated yet. Id.
144
See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 10–11.
145
See LOPGR, supra note 69, art. 10 Bis.
146
Alberto Herrera Pérez, Fiscalía Especializada en Combate a la Corrupción (breves comentarios jurídicos a su creación), 34 CUESTIONES
CONSTITUCIONALES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 225,
227 (2016).
147
Before the 2016 reform, these offenses were called “crimes committed by
public officials.” Currently the offenses are the following: illicit exercise of public
141
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The FECC was created in 2014148 after a constitutional political
reform that changed the PGR’s organic framework. This constitutional reform granted the PGR the nature of an autonomous body.149
The promulgation of a new Organic Law and the appointment of a
new Attorney General, which took place in December 2018, was
necessary to finish the transformation process.150 The lack of political consensus between political forces and the disagreement between various civil groups with the procedure envisaged151 have
caused this delay of four years.
These disagreements have impacted the start-up of the FECC.
Since its creation in 2014, the body has had no holder because its
initial appointment also has corresponded to the Senate. Thus, in the
absence of a prosecutor, this SNA branch has not been put into full
operation.

service, abuse of authority, forced disappearance of person, coalition of public
officials, illicit use of powers and faculties, extortion, intimidation, abuse of functions, trading in influence, bribery, bribery of foreign public officials, embezzlement, and illicit enrichment. See CPF, supra note 69, arts. 212–24.
148
See Acuerdo A/011/14 por el que se crea la Fiscalía Especializada en materia de Delitos relacionados con Hechos de Corrupción y se establecen sus
atribuciones, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 03-12-2014 (Mex.).
149
The reform also changed the Attorney General’s Office’s name: instead of
“Procuraduría” it becomes “Fiscalía”. See Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, en materia política-electoral, art. 102.A, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 02-10-2014 (Mex.).
150
The entry into force of these reforms was conditioned on the issuance of
secondary rules, after which an “express declaration” by the Congress of the
“coming into force of the constitutional autonomy of the Republic Attorney General’s Office” should be done. See id. art. Sixteenth Transitory.
151
The 2014 reform provides that the Attorney General in office (appointed
by the president) at the time which Congress issues the autonomy declaration will
keep as a holder of the new office and will last nine years in chair. This is the
central point of the debate because several civil society organizations claim that
this procedure will not guarantee the independence of the Attorney. See Arturo
Angel, ¿Cómo elegir al fiscal general? Lo que quiere AMLO vs. la propuesta de
#FiscalíaQueSirva, ANIMAL POLÍTICO (July 10, 2018), https://www.animalpolitico.com/2018/07/fiscal-general-amlo-propuesta/.
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G.

Local Anti-Corruption Systems
Finally, the coordination between the 32 federal states and the
Federation is another part of SNA’s axis. According to the constitutional model, federal entities must create local anti-corruption systems that should replicate the federal system’s structure and institutions, which are central committees; control and oversight bodies;
prosecutor’s office; and specialized courts with jurisdiction for imposing sanctions on individuals and private companies.152
Local systems’ representatives will join the SNA, completing
the complex model. This means that states must also harmonize their
legislation with the federal sphere by enacting these seven laws at
the local level. Likewise, they must proceed with the integration of
the instances and the appointment of the bodies’ holders. Until September 2018, twenty-one states have completed and implemented
the legislative’s harmonization. However, only sixteen states have
fully established the whole system.153
IV.

NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION SYSTEM’S IMMEDIATE
FUTURE

A.

New Government: New Legal Reforms?
Corruption was one of the main issues during the 2018 electoral
process. Mutual accusations of acts of corruption dominated the
presidential campaign, instead of public policies and proposals. Finally, the PRI’s defeat was associated with the great corruption
scandals unleashed during Peña Nieto’s term,154 in which the same
president was involved.
The winning candidate made the fight against corruption one of
his main flagship issues. In his rhetoric speeches, López Obrador

152

See CPEUM, supra note 93, art. 113.
See Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción, Seguimiento. Sistemas Locales Anticorrupción de las Entidades Federativas (Sept. 17, 2018), formato PDF,
http://sna.org.mx/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Seguimiento_32SLA-17.09.2018Tablas.pdf.
154
See Sonia Corona, El PRI se derrumba tras las elecciones en México, EL
PAÍS (July 3, 2018), formato HTML, https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/07/02/mexico/1530556371_889535.html.
153
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talked about an authentic “crusade” or a “social movement” to combating corruption.155 However, among his proposals, he did not present a clear position about the SNA’s future.156 The document, “50
points to fight corruption,” which was made public after its triumph,
indicates various measures of austerity, transparency, and control of
public officials but does not mention the SNA.157 Regarding institutional framework, this document only mentions the issue of the anticorruption prosecutor’s autonomy.158
After July 1st, this silence about the SNA provoked uncertainty.
It is unclear whether the new government intends to continue the
agency159 or plans to replace it with another institutional project.
Considering the lack of continuity of public policies across presidential periods that are usual in Mexico, the main fear is that López
Obrador’s government will turn the rudder and abandon the SNA to
make a fresh start. On the other hand, some “bad signals” after
López Obrador’s triumph have also contributed to the uncertainty.
For example, he has been tolerant with the incorporation into
MORENA of politicians with records of corruption.160 Fronting
López Obrador’s silence, the SNA’s Citizen Committee has delivered the results of a public consultation about the integration of the
national anti-corruption policy that has been carried out in the last

155

See Alejandro Medina, La cruzada de AMLO contra la corrupción,
FORBES (May 18, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/la-cruzada-de-amlo-contra-la-corrupcion/.
156
See Palmira Tapia, El Sistema Anticorrupción y el nuevo gobierno, FORBES
(July 25, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/el-sistema-anticorrupcion-y-el-nuevo-gobierno/.
157
See Los 50 puntos del plan anticorrupción y de austeridad de AMLO,
FORBES (July 15, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.forbes.com.mx/estos-sonlos-50-puntos-del-plan-anticorrupcion-y-de-austeridad-de-amlo/.
158
Id.
159
See Robert Clark, AMLO’s Election and the Future of Mexico’s National
Anti-Corruption System, FCPAMÉRICAS (July 30, 2018), https://fcpamericas.com/english/enforcement/amlos-election-futuremexicos-national-anti-corruption-system/.
160
See Leo Zuckerman, Las malas señales de AMLO en combate a la corrupción, EXCÉLSIOR (July 10, 2018), formato HTML, https://www.excelsior.com.mx/opinion/leo-zuckermann/las-malas-senales-de-amlo-en-combate-ala-corrupcion/1251311.
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months of 2018.161 This is a way to say – here we are, and we will
continue working.
As the inauguration approached, the picture begins to clear. Irma
Eréndira Sandoval (López Obrador’s proposal for SFP’s head) has
indicated that the SNA will be maintained, adjusting the designation
processes of the SNA’s dependencies’ heads and incorporating the
bodies in charge of electoral matters: National Electoral Institute
(Instituto Nacional Electoral) and Office of the Prosecutor Specialized in Electoral Crimes (Fiscalía Especializada para la Atención
de Delitos Electorales).162 Besides, the team in transition has not
expressly proposed the creation of new institutions.
Instead of starting from zero, the incoming government has a
great opportunity to give continuity to the SNA. The new administration should recognize that it was an initiative supported by a
coalition of civil society actors163 and not an exclusive idea of Peña
Nieto’s group. López Obrador comes to power with enough political
backup to promote the consensus required to complete the SNA’s
starting-up in the critical areas of prosecution and punishment of
corruption offenses.
Additionally, the promulgation of new legislation mentions the
specific matters of conflicts of interest, witnesses, and whistleblowers protection.164 Senators of MORENA have already presented in-

161

See Héctor Molina, Presentarán a AMLO propuesta de política anticorrupción a finales de año, EL ECONOMISTA (Aug. 29, 2018), formato HTML,
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Presentaran-a-AMLO-propuesta-depolitica-anticorrupcion-a-finales-de-ano-20180829-0048.html.; see also Sistema
Nacional Anticorrupción, Propuesta de la Política Nacional Anticorrupción
(Dec. 14, 2018), formato PDF, http://www.gob.mx/sesna/articulos/propuesta-depolitica-nacional-anticorrupcion-185184.
162
See Ariadna Ortega, ¿Qué ‘ajustes’ quiere hacer el equipo de AMLO al
SNA?, ADNPOLÍTICO (Oct. 3, 2018), https://adnpolitico.com/presidencia/2018/10/03/que-ajustes-quiere-hacer-el-equipo-de-amlo-al-sna.
163
See Clark, supra note 159 (stating that López Obrador, recognizing the
“value of continuity and stability[,] . . . can find a way to build on the work Mexico’s civil society has performed in codifying the National Anti-Corruption System, instead of letting this potentially durable tool turn to rust”).
164
See Ortega, supra note 162.
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itiatives before the Chamber of Senators to elevate the acts of corruption to the category of serious criminal offenses.165 As a consequence, this measure would result in the preventive imprisonment
of the accused during the prosecution. This proposal was formulated
by López Obrador himself during his campaign.166
In general, the adjustments are positively expected. Analysts
acknowledge that, after two years of half operations, the SNA has
not yielded visible results beyond showing that Mexico still lacks a
national and articulated anti-corruption public policy.167 Consequently, it is conveniently updating to an SNA “version 2.0”168 that
consolidates the coordination and articulation of public policy.
Firstly, the debate on whether maintaining the current specialized
prosecutor appointment process or reforming it should be resolved.169
For adjusting, it is necessary to have clarity about the SNA’s
nature. The big innovation introduced by 2016 legal reforms was the
SNA’s central coordination body, which was formed by the central
committees. However, these reforms did not create new institutions
for the tasks of control and oversight. These tasks belonged to institutions that already existed and performed their functions with
greater or lesser effectiveness. In the case of the tasks of prosecution
and sanction of responsibilities, the new specialized institutions are
still not working, as it has been mentioned.
In this way, the current lack of results in the prevention and punishment of acts of corruption should not be understood as a direct
failure of the SNA’s coordination head, but rather, because of deficiencies of the bodies that converge on the system. In this manner,
165

See Senado de la República, Elevar a delitos graves corrupción, robo de
hidrocarburos, portación de armas y fraudes electorales, propone Ricardo Monreal (Sept. 20, 2018), formato HTML http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/boletines/41774-elevar-a-delitos-graves-corrupcion-robode-hidrocarburos-portacion-de-armas-y-fraudes-electorales-propone-ricardomonreal.html.
166
See Trabaja el presidente electo de México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador en dos paquetes de iniciativas de reformas (Aug. 10, 2018), formato HTML,
https://lopezobrador.org.mx/temas/combate-a-la-corrupcion/.
167
See Eduardo Bohórquez, Por un Sistema Nacional Anticorrupción 2.0,
LETRAS LIBRES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.letraslibres.com/mexico/revista/porun-sistema-nacional-anticorrupcion-20-0.
168
Id.
169
See Angel, supra note 151.
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the adjustments must begin from a diagnosis of each institution’s
weaknesses to refine the necessary details for improving. The creation of new bureaucratic bodies should not be the option if it leads
to the fragmentation of efforts.170
On the other hand, linking the SNA with other administration
bodies is proposed. For example, the Ministry of Education must
promote integrity and ethics through educational policies.171 Likewise, the Ministry of Finance will provide the necessary resources
for the system operation.172 As a coordination agency, SNA should
direct and draw the route, but not work isolated from the rest of the
State.173 Anti-corruption actions should be carried out in a transversal way by many governmental actors.
Politicians and administrators should have in mind that the establishment of the SNA is only the starting point of a long road. Its
mere creation is not a guarantee of anything.174 There is a long list
of anti-corruption institutions that have failed in both Mexico175 and
in the world.176 Besides being provided with the necessary resources, the SNA’s success depends on the government granting the

170

See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 578 (stating that in Mexico’s
institutional reforms “[t]here is a fragmentation of efforts resulting in more bureaucracy . . . [as] [e]ach project . . . is added on to the previous one, resulting in
a patchwork system (instituciones ‘chipotle’)”).
171
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 96, at 35–36.
172
See id.
173
Id. (stating that “[a]nti-corruption is a cross-cutting issue that involves all
of government”). “A typical failure of anti-corruption strategies is that implementation is assigned to a single anti-corruption body . . . without acknowledging that
these bodies usually lack the authority to demand action from other public institutions.” Id.
174
See CASAR, supra note 4, at 53.
175
See Márquez, supra note 50, at 75, 92 (stating that the new mechanisms
“will not eliminate corruption in the country because they replicate the same
model established for reforming legal institutions”). The Mexican anticorruption
model has a “dysfunctional nature”: “it has the laws and the institutions, but little
or no eﬀectiveness.” Id.
176
See de Sousa, supra note 78, at 1 (stating that Anti-Corruption Agencies
“are often regarded by governments, donors and international governmental organizations . . . as the ultimate institutional response to corruption. Most [agencies] have been set up in a context of systemic corruption and a considerable number of them have fallen short of the expectations raised”).
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political backup required to directly confront the interests of the corrupt groups entrenched in power. If the government does not show
the will to challenge these factions, anti-corruption institutions’ mission will fail as soon as it meets the wall of those interests.177
B.
International Anti-Corruption Conventions Implementation
Gaps
Full compliance of recommendations derived from international
conventions still is a pending issue to be addressed in the immediate
future of anti-corruption institutions. In 2012, the country had only
complied with the implementation of 23% of the measures contained in the UNCAC or Merida’s Convention.178 The Report on
compliance derived from the visit of the Intergovernmental Review
Mechanism in 2013 recommended specific legislative adjustments,
such as the harmonization of the criminal offenses provided in Mexican legislation with the corruption conduct listed in the UNCAC.179
The 2016 reforms met most of those recommendations for the
federal level. However, some issues remain pending, such as the
criminalization of transnational passive bribery,180 as well as the
possibility of criminalizing bribery181 and embezzlement182 in the
private sector. Similarly, the Mexican legislation on illicit enrichment has some issues that should be removed, including the requirement of connection with the individual’s employment, which does
not appear in the UNCAC.183 At the local level, the differences between the 32 penal codes of states and the Convention’s corruption
177

See Tromme & Lara Otaola, supra note 2, at 578 (stating that “[a]lthough
some [agencies] have been successful in fighting corruption, in most cases, they
falter whenever they uncover the dirty linen of those in power (c.f. the Icarus Paradox)”).
178
See Edgardo Buscaglia, supra note 33, at 276.
179
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Informe sobre el examen
de México. Examen por Azerbaiyán y Perú sobre la aplicación por parte de
México de los artículos 15 – 42 del Capítulo III. “Penalización y aplicación de la
ley” y artículos 44-50 del Capítulo IV. “Cooperación Internacional” de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Corrupción para el ciclo de examen
2010 – 2015, 1, 21 (Nov. 3-4, 2015).
180
See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 16.
181
See id. art. 21.
182
See id. art. 22.
183
See id. art. 20.
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offenses are extensive. It is very important to move towards the homogenization of the states’ penal codes regarding corruption.
In addition to the substantive adjustments, the UNCAC’s Review Mechanism recommended several procedural changes, such as
extending the protection of witnesses, whistleblowers, and their relatives and close persons,184 which Mexican law provides for cases
of serious offenses and organized crime, to cases regarding corruption offenses.185 The 2016 reforms addressed this issue by stating
the possibility of anonymous complaints as well as identity protection measures for whistleblowers and witnesses in administrative liability proceedings for acts of corruption.186 Likewise, since 2014,
the criminal proceedings law contemplates protection measures for
witnesses and whistleblowers in criminal proceedings.187
However, these protections are not enough because Mexican law
does not include clear safeguarding mechanisms post-intervention
in the criminal process. For example, there are not legal protections
in labor matters for cases in which the informant or witness suffer
negative consequences, such as removal.188 The insufficient protection of whistleblowers and witnesses is also an aspect that has been
highlighted by the Follow-up Mechanism on the implementation of
IACAC, suggesting the adoption of a better regulation in the matter.189
184

See id. art. 32–33.
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 179, at 6.
186
See LGRA, supra note 68, arts. 64, 91.
187
See Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales [National Code of Criminal Proceedings], as amended, arts. 367, 370, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF], Mar. 5, 2014 (Mex.) [hereinafter CNPP].
188
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 96, at 127 (stating that “[c]omprehensive whistleblower protection includes a number of mechanisms that seek to compensate whistleblowers experiencing reprisals in the workplace, such as dismissal, demotion or suspension;
transfer or reassignment; or change in duties”).
189
See Organization of American States, Mechanism for Follow-Up on Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption [MESISIC].
Mexico: Final Report, 77 (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic5_inf_mex_eng.pdf (recommending, in order of the implementation of
IACAC art. III.8, the adoption of a “comprehensive regulation on the protection
of public servants and private citizens who in good faith report acts of corruption,
including protecting their identity, in accordance with the CPEUM and the fundamental principles of its domestic legal order, bearing in mind the criteria set forth
185
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Regarding the benefits for the participants in corruption offenses
who later collaborate with the justice as witnesses or informants,190
the Mexican procedural law contemplates some privileged treatments, for example: the reduction of punishment, subject to the admission of responsibility in an abbreviated trial;191 or the exemption
of judicial process by application of an opportunity criterion, which
is subjected to the provision of information for the prosecution of a
more serious crime.192 However, these general measures niether refer specifically to corruption offenses nor do they reach the level of
“judicial immunity” recommended by the UNCAC.193
Mexico also has some pending adjustments related to the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The last implementation report of
2014 pointed out several recommendations that still have not been
attended, such as amendments in the legislation on liability of legal
entities for foreign bribery (particularly in the case of companies
owned and controlled by the State) and in the topics of sanctions and
confiscation of property against legal entities.194
In this context, the SNA’s Coordinating Committee should undertake the task of reviewing compliance with the commitments established in the treaties signed by Mexico and promoting those that
remain unattended. Likewise, within the objectives of the anti-corruption policy, the SNA should promote in all levels of government
a greater public officials’ knowledge on the treaties. The agreements
should be understood as a “model law” that guides the normative
construction of the national system.195

in the ‘Model Law to Facilitate and Encourage the Reporting of Acts of Corruption and to Protect Whistleblowers and Witnesses,’” which was endorsed by the
MESICIC Committee of Experts in 2013).
190
See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 37.
191
See CNPP, supra note 187, arts. 201–02.
192
See id. art. 256.V.
193
See UNCAC, supra note 83, art. 37.3.
194
See generally Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
Mexico: Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations (Mexico, 2014).
195
See Issa Luna Pla, El papel de los Tratados Internacionales en el Sistema
Nacional Anticorrupción, in CÓMO COMBATIR LA CORRUPCIÓN 199 (Pedro Salazar et al. coords., 2017).
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C.

Required Cultural Shifts
The sole creation of the SNA will not reduce corruption. The
examples in the world show that anti-corruption agencies like the
SNA are not the panacea.196 In addition, corruption is not only an
economic phenomenon197 but multifactorial. To that extent, institutional work should promote different strategies that include actions
in the educational and cultural spheres. Policy should promote a new
organizational culture within the government and companies, implement a culture of denouncement and punishment, and strengthen
prevention by improving the effectiveness of sanctions. Corruption
is the result of a combination of factors; so, its elimination requires
a change of that combination.198
As mentioned before, Mexico’s cultural situation facilitates corruption. In a vicious circle, culture appears both as a corruption’s
cause and effect.199 Hence, as a priority, institutions must promote
changes in the Mexican value systems by educational policies.200
Besides new generations’ formation in schools, an authentic “social
pedagogy”201 is required for educating the population in the “conscience of corruption.”202 These cultural and educational policies
must have an impact on social conventions so that people themselves will reject corrupt practices.203
López Obrador’s government expectations are based on the generation of this new culture of values, which will extend to the administration and government fields. López Obrador has insisted his
government will not be only a political change but a “Fourth Social
196

See de Sousa, supra note 78, at 5.
See Hindess, supra note 76, at 11.
198
See Castañeda Rodríguez, supra note 48, at 131.
199
See generally Morris, supra note 3.
200
See García González et al., supra note 16, at 255 (stating that the legal or
institutional perspectives “will surely be insufficient if they are not joined by a
complementary strategy which includes a fundamental change in the system of
values of Mexican society”). “Only this type of approach, aimed at familiarizing
the Mexican public with and indoctrinating it in a more ethical political culture,
will truly allow for new anti-corruption measures and regulations to be accepted
by Mexican society.” Id.
201
Gil Villa, supra note 35, at 273.
202
Id.
203
See Márquez, supra note 50, at 100 (stating that “[c]orruption is not eliminated by creating ‘laws’ and ‘agencies,’ but by generating an important impact
on the political-social conventions so as to reject this practice”).
197
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Transformation of Mexico”204 that will drive profound changes. According to him, this transformation will be based on a “republican
austerity”205 policy that will eliminate the privileges and excesses of
the political class and will allow Mexico to rebuild the confidence
of the citizens in the rulers. For this cultural change, the president
will be the first to set the example.206
Beyond rhetoric, it is clear that a mandate will not eliminate the
corruption. The beginning of cultural change requires specific actions, such as the spread of a public service culture based in moderation, ethics, and responsibility. For cultivating this “culture of integrity”207 within public bodies, generalizing the adoption of codes
of ethics and conduct has been recommended.208 These codes of ethics and conduct in all government levels should follow the new
guidelines established by the SNA.
In 2002, the SFP issued a code of ethics, which established the
principles that should govern the behavior of public servants, among
others. The code of ethics called for the following: promotion of the
common good, integrity, honesty, impartiality, justice, transparency, accountability, and generosity.209 A new code of ethics enacted in 2015 defines the constitutional principles of legality, honesty, loyalty, impartiality, and efficiency.210 This code also refers to
204

See Declaración de Principios de Morena, https://lopezobrador.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Declaracion-de-PrincipiosMORENA.pdf. (consultada Feb. 20, 2019).
204
See Los 50 puntos del plan anticorrupción y de austeridad de AMLO, supra
note 157.
205
Id.
206
See id. (stating that among other austerity measures, President of the Republic’s and senior officials’ salaries reduction is proposed as well as the elimination of new vehicles and other non essentials goods purchasing).
207
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 96, at 53.
208
See id. at 53–56.
209
See Oficio-Circular por el que se da a conocer el Código de Ética de los
Servidores Públicos de la Administración Pública Federal, Diario Oficial de la
Federación
[DOF],
July
31,
2002
(Mex.)
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=727307&fecha=31/07/2002.
210
See Acuerdo que tiene por objeto emitir el Código de Ética de los servidores públicos del Gobierno Federal, las Reglas de Integridad para el ejercicio de
la función pública, y los Lineamientos generales para propiciar la integridad de
los servidores públicos y para implementar acciones permanentes que favorezcan
su comportamiento ético, a través de los Comités de Ética y de Prevención de
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some values, such as public interest, respect for human rights, equality and non-discrimination, gender equity, integrity, transparency,
and accountability.211 Also, it establishes integrity rules in twelve
areas, including public behavior, public contracting, licensing, permissions, authorizations and concessions, internal control, and cooperation with integrity.212 In this way, the 2015 extensive code of
ethics includes a wide range of principles and values that make it
complex. Due to the codes’ complexity, the streamlining of the document and the elaboration of more comprehensive manuals or
guides in plain language has been recommended.213
Ethics policies must also target the organizational culture of the
private sector. In Mexico today, as mentioned, corruption is not only
a state issue but is also internalized within companies. The normalization of corruption provokes a “slide effect”:214 own organizations’ practices lead individuals to fall into dishonest acts.215 In this
way, companies and employers must be considered a central part of
both the problem and the solution. The SNA should have powers to
require them to establish integrity policies and make them public.216
Therefore, the integration of private economy sector representatives into the SNA is necessary. The participation of civil society
organizations that occurred with the creation of the Citizens Committee in 2016 was a great step forward, but the move towards the
business organizations, which also have responsibility in the issue
and must coordinate efforts with the State, is pending.217
Conflictos de Interés, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], Aug. 20, 2015
(Mex.).
211
See id.
212
See id.
213
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 96, at 85 (stating that “[t]he SFP could consider removing the Integrity
Rules from the Ethics Code and developing, based and building on these rules, a
more comprehensive manual or guide in plain language and with sets of examples
for the federal public administration for public officials at all levels”).
214
Arellano Gault, supra note 15, at 171.
215
Id.; see also Arellano Gault, supra note 47.
216
See María Marván Laborde, 500 empresas frente a la corrupción, HECHOS
Y
DERECHOS
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/hechos-y-derechos/article/view/11747/13574.
217
See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 96, at 36 (recommending that “[t]o ensure a whole-of-society approach, the [SNA] Citizen Participation Committee should establish a specific
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Besides the promotion of moral values of honesty and integrity
as a part of a cultural shift, more pragmatic changes should be
pushed for the prevention of corruption. Citizens should adopt a permanent watchdog attitude and normalize the reporting of corruption
acts. Transparency policies, whistleblowers protection measures,
and even the strengthening of free press218 and working rights219 are
aspects that can encourage the generation of that denouncement culture.
However, the denunciation is of little use if judicial processes
fail, which it has up to now. An adequate criminal policy220 and
strong judicial institutions are fundamental,221 but political will is
crucial. Political will, reflected in the decision of impartially applying the law to all cases, is indispensable to have success on imposing
sanctions.222 The application of the law should not wane to a random

working group comprised of private sector representatives in order to reflect private sector anti-corruption initiatives in the national action plan”).
218
See Piero Stanig, Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption: An Empirical Analysis of the Mexican Press, 59 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 175, 175
(2015) (stating the importance of reducing legal barriers for free press to strengthening the corruption fight).
219
See Castañeda Rodríguez, supra note 48, at 113 (stating that it will be more
likely that a citizen chooses to remain in silent after witnessing an act of corruption if unemployment prevails in the economy). In this scenario, the expected cost
of reporting would be high, given the risk of losing job because of the retaliation
of those involved. Id.
220
See Joan J. Queralt, Reflexiones marginales sobre la corrupción, 2
REVISTA CRÍTICA PENAL Y PODER 18, 20 (2012) (stating that an adequate criminal
policy must be based “on four central elements: correct definition of the criminal
types, adequate penalties, effective execution that strengthens both general and
special prevention, and a procedural system that, without diminishing the guarantees, does not suppose a source of impunity or . . . a source of random punishment”).
221
See Castañeda Rodríguez, supra note 48, at 117 (stating that “there is a
consensus that a strong judicial system with a favorable image reduces the
chances of corruption”).
222
See Jon S.T. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in Singapore: Lessons for Latin
American Countries, in COMO DISMINUIR LA CORRUPCIÓN Y MEJORAR LA
GOBERNABILIDAD EN PAÍSES DE DESARROLLO 132, 133 (2014) (“Latin American
countries can learn these five lessons from Singapore’s effective anti-corruption
strategy: (1) political will is critical for success in curbing corruption; (2) rely on
a single anti-corruption agency [ . . . ] instead of multiple [agencies] to combat
corruption; (3) enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially, not selectively; (4)
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or selective223 imposition of punishments. Law enforcement institutions should proceed against all responsible parties for their acts of
corruption, regardless of the political group to which they belong.224
So far, anti-corruption policies and measures have failed in really
facing powerful corrupt forces. As long as Mexican anti-corruption
forces do not confront the abusive exercise of political power to
tame it and impose limitations on it, they will continue to be a simulation.225
Application of justice is fundamental to spread the idea that impunity will no longer be the rule. To the extent that these sanctions
begin to occur, the deterrent effect of the sanctions will be generated,
and more importantly, the citizens will regain confidence in the institutions.226 Ultimately, if this does not happen, and the government
again fails to meet the expectation for change, as happened with Fox
in 2000, it will be up to civil society to push towards change. The
involvement of the citizens should keep growing as it has done up
to now.
V.
CONCLUSION
Corruption is one of many problems that López Obrador’s government will face, alongside the dramatic situation on issues of
criminality and the violence crisis. To tackle corruption, incoming
cut red tape to reduce the opportunities for corruption; and (5) enhance public
trust in politicians and civil servants by curbing corruption.”).
223
Id.
224
Recently, Javier Duarte, former governor of the State of Veracruz, accused
of multiple acts of corruption, was sentenced to nine years in prison. The sentence
caused controversy as the punishment was considered insufficient. This condemnation of Duarte occurred in an abbreviated procedure, which allows the attenuation of punishment in exchange for the accused’s admission of responsibility. See
Gonzalo Sánchez de Tagle & Alejandro Hernández Oseguera, La sentencia de
Javier Duarte. Un análisis legal, NEXOS (Oct. 1, 2018), formato HTML,
https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=9034.
225
See Jaime Cárdenas, Causas de la corrupción y soluciones para enfrentarla, in CÓMO COMBATIR LA CORRUPCIÓN 223 (Pedro Salazar et al. coords., 2017)
(“[A]nti-corruption laws constitute a simulation because the institutional scaffolding that they create is controlled by the Executive’s head and by the three major
parties. These laws do not face the power in Mexico that is the producer of corruption in the country.”).
226
See Quah, supra note 222.
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government must define its tools and make a starting decision:
whether to endorse or abandon the scaffolding of the SNA. López
Obrador has already shown he can abandon without doubting projects associated with the previous government, whether institutional
(as the educational reform and energetic reform) or even contracts
for public works (as the new international airport). Thus, some
weeks after his inauguration, the question remains in the air.
In my opinion, the SNA should not be left out of the fourth transformation. The creation of new institutions would be a bad idea because Mexico does not need new institutions for its same old problems. Adjusting the ones already existing and taking advantage of
their experience even if it is minimal would be a better decision.
Thus, the most reasonable option is to keep the SNA and refine it on
the points that should be defined in the public debate in the coming
days. Besides the aspects indicated on this paper, one of the main
shortcomings of the SNA is its unnecessary complexity: so many
coordinating committees and subsystems can decay into a new form
of bureaucracy. Simplification of structures and clarification of
functions will be useful.
With or without the SNA, Lopez Obrador’s true challenge will
be to bring institutions to life. To accomplish this, new government’s intention is crucial. They must decide to act right now and
show the public that tolerance is over. Let me end with this image:
the fight against corruption could be seen as a car race. In Mexico
we have not even left the grid. The SNA is the greatest car that we
have ever had, but it remains stopped. It will hinge on López Obrador’s administration whether the car remains stopped or finally
starts its engine and moves towards the finish line.

